FIDDAMAN blog book review - British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan - Losing Small Wars by Frank Ledwidge

When plans fall apart, military commanders talk of "the Question Four moment". This is the point at which matters have changed so dramatically that the entire mission has to be questioned and the original mission or objective redrawn. Much of the leadership of the Western world is now facing its Question Four moment - on matters as varied as the debt and currency crisis, the ragged war in Libya, nuclear power and climate change.




The Question Four moments came early on for British forces in their missions this century to Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular after they were sent to Helmand in the spring of 2006. Quite why things went so badly wrong - and the damaging effect on the international reputation of the UK - is the subject of Frank Ledwidge's thought-provoking and quirky new book.



He has spent a good deal of time in both countries, first as a reservist intelligence officer and then as a civilian adviser. His book is written in the tone of a highly intelligent enthusiast who can barely control his outrage at the shortcomings of British commanders and their military ethos and culture.



Prime culprits for the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan are the generals themselves. They have been consumed by the perception of almost unbroken British military success since the 1950s, the Falklands, the long counter-insurgency in Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Bluntly, Ledwidge says the generals "are not good enough", and at one point calls them "mendacious".